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Relieving the 
debt burden: 
past experience and 
present needs 
Carlos Massad* 
The rapid growth of the Latin American external 
debt from the mid-1970s onwards has been due to 
factors both of demand and supply, which bear wit-
ness to the co-responsibility of creditors and debtors. 
This co-responsibility, however, is not reflected in 
the distribution between the two parties of the bur-
den of the debt: a situation which has caused a change 
not only in the magnitude but also in the direction of 
the net flows of real resources between the region 
and the rest of the world. Thus, between I960 and 
1980 the countries of the region were recipients of an 
annual net transfer of real resources from abroad 
equal to around I % of their gross domestic product, 
but since the first half of the 1980s these countries 
have contributed to the rest of the world close on 4% 
of their gross domestic product per year. Although 
the figures vary from country to country, the general 
trend is the same for all. 
Despite this heavy transfer of real resources to 
the exterior, the foreign debt problem does not seem 
to be on the way to a solution. The debt continues to 
increase, albeit slowly, while exports, and also the 
product, remain relatively stagnant after having 
plummeted in 1982/1983, partly because of the 
countries' own efforts to adjust in order to comply 
with their external commitments in a context of 
world economic recession and shrinkage of the inter-
national financial markets. 
The author divides the article into four sections. 
In the first he examines the debt servicing burden, 
comparing the experience of the 1930s with the 
1980s, and presents a simulation model which ena-
bles different evolutions of this servicing and its 
effects to be assessed. He then describes the options 
for solution and the concrete proposals that have 
been formulated, and ends with some considerations 
on the role played by the international monetary and 
financial system. 
•Co-ordinator of the ECLAC/UNDP Project on 
"Implications for Latin America of the situation of the 
international monetary and financial system". The author 
acknowledges with thanks the collaboration of Daniel 
Titelman and the comments of tier: Rosenthal and 
Roberto Zahler. 
I 
The debt burden 
and adjustment 
1. Expansionary or recessionary adjustment? 
The continued transfer of real resources abroad 
diminishes those available for domestic con-
sumption and investment and makes necessary 
an equivalent surplus of saving over investment. 
It is precisely this surplus that is transferred 
abroad. 
In order to make this transfer, these resour-
ces have to be converted into transferable 
resources, which is achieved through the genera-
tion of an equivalent surplus of exports over 
imports. Thus, the surplus of saving over invest-
ment has its counterpart in the external sector. 
From the standpoint of employment and 
economic activity, the ideal combination of cir-
cumstances would be one in which the necessary 
surplus is generated through an increase in 
saving and is converted into resources transfera-
ble overseas through an increase in exports and 
efficient import substitution. In this way, the 
transfer would be achieved while maintaining a 
high level of activity and employment and wit-
hout sacrificing investment. The cost of the 
transfer in terms of well-being does not disap-
pear, since a part of the goods and services pro-
duced through the use of the available resources 
has to be transferred abroad. Nevertheless, this 
cost would be minimized with the disappearance 
of the problems linked with unemployment and 
the reduction of the growth potential. 
In the actual fact, however, the surplus to be 
transferred was generated through a drastic fall 
in investment, and its conversion into transfera-
ble resources was produced through a striking 
drop in imports, employment and the level of 
business activity. The contraction of imports had 
to create the macroeconomic space needed not 
only to transfer abroad the real resources invol-
ved in the servicing of the debt but also to accom-
modate a fall in the level of Latin American 
exports due to the unprecedented deterioration 
in the terms of trade and the prices of the overw-
helming majority of products exported by the 
region. 
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Thus, from their maximum level reached in 
1981, Latin American imports at constant prices 
have fallen by 40% so that their 1985 level is 
lower than that of 1974. The per capita gross 
domestic product in 1985 was 9% lower than in 
1980 and the fall in per capita national income, 
which takes into account the negative effect of 
the terms of trade and factor payments to the 
exterior (mainly profits and interest), was still 
more pronounced. 
The severity of the adjustment process and 
the high cost that the countries have been 
willing to pay in order to maintain normality as 
far as possible, in the servicing of their external 
debt, reveal the interest of the Latin American 
governments in maintaining a long-term rela-
tionship with the foreign financial markets. The 
governments have not been in favour of solu-
tions involving a rupture, and unilateral action 
has only occurred in isolated cases and through 
lack of other options. 
The events of 1985 and of the first half of 
1986 have helped to aggravate the debt problem 
in at least two aspects: the problem has become 
concentrated in a smaller number of countries, 
but its magnitude has not diminished; and the 
growth rate of the world economy does not 
appear to be reaching satisfactory levels even 
after the fall in oil prices. Moreover, the terms of 
trade (excluding oil) show no signs of recovery 
despite the brusque devaluation of the dollar on 
international markets. It seems that time is not 
helping to solve the problem, except in so far as 
it enables the creditors to strengthen their equity 
position (by increases in their reserves and capi-
tal) so as to place themselves in a better position 
to cope with their portfolio risks. The passage of 
time might also allow certain adjustment poli-
cies adopted by the debtor countries to begin to 
show some effect, but the implications for the 
world economy and the terms of trade of a situa-
tion in which many countries, are adjusting at 
the same time and in the same direction do not 
encourage much hope in this respect. 
2. The debt servicing burden 
Although the nominal interest rates applicable 
to the debt are now only half what they were in 
1981, the continuing rise in the volume of the 
debt, coupled with the persistent deterioration 
in the terms of trade, mean that the debt servi-
cing burden continues to increase. For a country 
that had experienced a fall in its terms of trade 
similar to that of the group of non-oil-exporting 
countries of Latin America, the cost of paying 
one dollar of interest, expressed in terms of real 
resources, would have grown by 50% between 
1980 and 1984. This means that if in 1980 it was 
necessary to sacrifice a hundred units of tradea-
ble goods in order to service the debt, at the end 
of 1984 it was necessary to sacrifice a hundred 
and fifty units for the same service (Massad, 
1986a). In 1985 the situation was even worse, 
since the fall in interest payments did not suc-
ceed in compensating for the further fall in the 
terms of trade. 
Two elements are decisive in this result: the 
interest rates and other costs applicable to the 
foreign debt, and the variation in the terms of 
trade. The behaviour of both is largely beyond 
the control of the individual debtor countries. 
These, however, do have a collective influence, 
neither sought for nor desired, on the terms of 
trade. Their simultaneous efforts to increase 
their exports, particularly of primary products, 
in a world economy of sluggish growth have a 
depressive effect on the prices of those products, 
so that without wanting to, they aggravate their 
own external finance problems (Massad, 1984). 
This effect has now been recognized internatio-
nally (BIS, 1986; JEC, 1986). 
3. The 1930s and the 1980s 
From the standpoint of employment and econo-
mic activity, particularly in Latin America, the 
crisis of the 1980s has features at least as serious 
as those of the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
The terms of trade of the non-oil-exporting 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in 
1985 were even worse than those recorded in any 
year of the earlier great world crisis. For the 
countries of the region as a whole, the terms of 
trade in 1985 were only 4% higher than the 
average between 1930 and 1937 (see table 1 and 
figures I and II). During the great world crisis the 
bulk of the debt consisted of bonds floated 
abroad, for which there was a market. When the 
crisis radically reduced the debtor countries' 
capacity to make payments abroad and they 
found themselves obliged to suspend totally or 
partially their servicing of the debt, the market 
price of the bonds plummeted. In 1939, for ins-
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tance, seven years after the worst moment of the 
crisis, South American bonds with arrears of 
payment were quoted at 14% of their nominal 
value, Central American bonds at 30% and West 
Indian bonds at 46% of their value. Between 
1935 and 1939 Chile purchased bonds of its own 
debt with a nominal value of US$ 88 million at 
the prices of the period for a payment of around 
US$ 13 million, that is, it paid 15 cents for each 
dollar of debt (Feuerlein and Hanna, 1941). This 
contraction of the debt represented a reduction 
of one-third in the total Chilean debt in bonds 
expressed in 1935 dollars. 
Through the application of this mechanism 
and the total or partial suspension of debt servi-
cing, its burden was distributed between credi-
tors and debtors. In the crisis of the 1980s the 
cases of default are few and the burden of debt 
servicing, except in a few isolated and unimpor-
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: TERMS OF TRADE, 
1930-1985 
(Indexes 1970 = 100) 
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Source: 1930-1949: ECLAC (1977). 
1950-1985: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Includes 19 countries. 
Excludes Mexico, Venezuela, Ecuador. 
c
 Preliminary figures. 
tant cases, has not been lightened for the debtor 
in relation to market conditions. The debt is 
mainly with the banking system, and the profits 
of the major creditor banks have grown steadily 
during the whole period. The exceptions to this 
(mainly the Bank of America) have no connec-
tion with the portfolio of loans to the developing 
countries but rather with the internal economic 
situation of some sectors and enterprises in the 
United States (JEC, 1986). 
During the crisis of the 1930s, agreements 
were concluded between creditors and debtors 
which reduced the capital of the debt and lowe-
red the interest payments far below those of the 
market, as well as extending the payment period. 
Agreements of this type have not been achieved 
in the crisis of the 1980s. On the contrary, the 
transfers of real resources overseas by the Latin 
American debtor countries due to the payment 
of interest on their debt, as a proportion of their 
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Figure I 
LATIN AMERICA:3 INDEX OF TERMS OF TRADE, 1930-1985 
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Source: 1930-1949: ECLAC (1977); 1950-1985: ECLAC, on the basis of official information. 
aIncludes 19 countries. 
exports, are far above even those made by Ger-
many after the Treaty of Versailles in respect 
both of war reparations and of interest payments 
on its foreign debt and remittances of profits. 
In fact, the total net profits, interest and war 
reparations paid to the exterior never reached 
2 5 % of German exports, even in the worst days 
of the great crisis. In the case of Latin America, 
in contrast, payments of interest and profits 
bordered on 40% of exports of goods from 1982 
onwards. What is more, when in 1931 these 
payments, including war reparations, reached 
23% of German exports (or 36% if capital flight 
from Germany is added), a special commission 
of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), 
responsible for advising the Bank on the ques-
tion of the payment of reparations, decided that 
Germany was justified in declaring that it could 
not comply with a large part of this obligation 
(Haberler, 1950). In the following year (1932) 
payments of war reparations fell by 84%, and 
they disappeared completely in 1933- Moreover, 
during the period of heaviest reparation pay-
ments, Germany was a net receiver of financial 
resources from abroad: between 1924 and 1932 
Germany's net capital inflows were 20% higher 
than the sum of the payments of interest, profits 
and war reparations (see table 2). 
The commercial banks that are creditors of 
Latin America have reached agreements with 
some enterprises whose debt is not State guaran-
teed to reduce the capital and alleviate interest 
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Figure II 
LATIN AMERICAN NON-OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES:2 
TERMS OF TRADE, 1930-1985 
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Source: 1930-1949: ECLAC (1977); 1950-1985: ECLAC, on the basis of official information. 
aExcludes Mexico, Venezuela and Ecuador. 
payments. However, the amounts involved are 
very small in relation to the total debt (less than 
1 %), so that these agreements have little signifi-
cance at the macroeconomic level. 
4. The debt burden and growth: 
a simulation model 
With the aim of assessing the magnitude of the 
efforts that the debtor countries must make in 
order to meet their debt obligations in a context 
of growth, a model was used (see the annex) 
which relates the growth rate of the debt with 
the external interest rate, the debt/product ratio, 
and the foreign trade imbalance (or the diffe-
rence between saving and investment) (Massad, 
1985; Massad 1986b). 
Use of the model called for the estimation of 
the investment needed to secure a growth of the 
product of 4% per year: a figure considered a 
minimum target. The investment rate required 
for a growth of 4% on average for the group of 
seven countries studied was 23% of the product. 
For the purposes of the simulation, however, a 
lower rate (20% of the product) was used, since 
it was considered that, as the countries had idle 
capacity and relatively high unemployment, it 
would be possible to grow with less investment 
than that required on average for long periods. A 
more precise study might attempt to estimate 
the investment requirements of a cyclical nature. 
It was also necessary to estimate the income-
elasticities of the demand for imports. The exis-
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Table 2 
GERMANY: CURRENT PAYMENTS A N D N E T INFLOW OF CAPITAL, 1924-1932 









































































































Source: Prepared on the basis of data compiled by the League of Nations (1945b). 
"Net interest and profits remitted abroad. Minus sign indicates net income. 
Includes net balance on other services, net capital inflow, and errors and omissions. The latter mainly represent 
unregistered capital movements. Minus sign indicates net outflow. 
ting estimates refer to average elasticities for 
long periods and do not permit an assessment of 
what will probably happen with imports when 
the product falls or rises with some abruptness. 
Hence, estimates were made of cyclical elastici-
ties, which turned out to be much higher than 
the average or trend elasticities, which were also 
calculated for purposes of comparison. The lat-
ter coincide with those estimated in other 
studies. 
The calculations were made country by 
country for seven Latin American nations: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru 
and Venezuela. With the results of the estimates 
mentioned, three sets of simulations were pre-
pared for different relative levels of indebted-
ness: high (corresponding to a debt equal to the 
product); medium (defined as a foreign debt 
equal to 70% of the product); and low (where 
the debt represents 50% of the gross domestic 
product). 
For each of these three levels of indebted-
ness, five different rates of real interest on the 
debt and three rates of real growth of the debt 
were used. Four consecutive annual periods were 
simulated, and the results were averaged out to 
obtain the figures given in tables 3, 4 and 5. The 
averages conceal a leap that occurs in the first 
year of the exercise, as the rates of saving adjust 
to the levels required. In some cases, the balance 
is such that it seems impossible to achieve it in 
practice, so that the level of the debt would have 
to grow more than was assumed. 
For the countries with high Indebtedness 
(table 3), if the nominal debt in dollars grows at 
3% per year and if the external rate of interest, 
which includes all the costs of the debt, is 10% 
per year, a domestic saving rate of 27% of the 
product would be required and there would have 
to be a real growth rate of exports of 18% per 
year on average in the first four years of the 
exercise, which would clearly be difficult to 
achieve. With an interest rate of 4% per year the 
saving needed for a growth of 4% is reduced to 
21% of the product (for a growth of the debt of 
3 % per year) and exports would have to increase 
at an annual average rate of 13%. 
The best of all the situations simulated, for 
all the countries, consists of a growth of the debt 
of 7% and an interest rate on the debt of 4% per 






























































































































































































































































"Assumes a nominal growth rate of the debt of 7% per year. 
Assumes a nominal growth rate of the debt of 3 % . 
'Assumes a zero nominal growth rate of the debt. 
Minus sign signifies inflow of resources from abroad. 
i = External interest rate (including all the costs of the external debt). 
I /Y = Ratio of investment/GDP required. 
AMI/Y = Minimum ratio of saving/GDP required. 
AME/Y = Medium ratio of saving/GDP required. 
A M X / Y = Maximum ratio of saving/GDP required. 
A I M / M = Growth rate of imports. 
A E X M I / E X = Minumum growth rate of exports required. 
A E X M E / E X = Medium growth rate of exports required. 
A E X M X / E X — Maximum growth rate of exports required. 
TRMI /Y = Minimum transfer of resources abroad/GDP. 
T R M E / Y = Medium transfer of resources abroad/GDP. 
T R M X / Y = Maximum transfer of resources abroad/GDP. 
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year. In these circumstances, the saving required 
is around 17%-18% of the product and the real 
growth rate of exports falls to 8%-9% per year. 
Although the rate of saving is similar to that 
recorded in recent years, the required growth 
rate of exports is much higher than that which 
was actually achieved. 
To judge from the available information, it 
does not seem likely that the external debt can 
grow at a nominal 7% per year. Even if it did, it 
would imply the maintenance of the present 
debt/product ratios, which does not seem desira-
ble as a long-term result. If it is assumed, for 
example, that the nominal growth of the debt is 
around 3% per year, the results deteriorate. In 
the best of cases domestic saving of 20% of the 
product is required, with a growth rate of 
exports of 9%-10% per year in real terms. It 
should be borne in mind that for the group of 
countries considered in the study the rate of 
saving in relation to the product in the period 
1981-1985 reached an average of 17%, while 
real exports grew at an annual average rate of 
5.4%. 
Even the figure of 3% nominal growth of 
the debt does not seem easy to achieve, so an 
analysis was also made of the situation when the 
debt does not grow (i.e., it falls in real terms). In 
this case, with an interest rate of 6% per year, in 
the best of all the situations simulated (that of a 
relatively low debt) the saving required is around 
23% of the product and the real growth of 
exports would have to be of the order of 14% per 
year on average. 
Naturally, if the interest rate were 8% ins-
tead of 6% and the debt remained constant, the 
results would be even worse: in the best of cases a 
domestic saving of 24% of the product would be 
needed, with a real annual export growth rate of 
15% on average. 
The high rate of export growth needed in 
every case shows that the "natural" solution to 
the debt problem depends decisively on the 
expansion of the world economy. If this does not 
grow enough, increases in exports such as those 
indicated are highly improbable, and even if they 
did occur, it would be at the cost of additional 
adverse effects on the terms of trade. 
The calculations show the obvious need to 
seek formulas to relieve the debt burden which 
will reduce the saving and export efforts requi-
red, even in the case of those countries with a 
relatively low debt. 
These formulas should alleviate the debt 
without cost, that is, to say, without using up 
resources of the debtor countries. There are only 
three ways of achieving this objective: reduction 
of real interest rates (or of the capital of the 
debt), improvement of the terms of trade, and an 
increase in the productivity of investments. The 
first two do not depend on the policies of the 
debtor countries, at least in the short term: it is 
the creditor countries which have the appro-
priate policy instruments in their hands. The 
third essentially depends on the domestic poli-
cies of the debtor countries, but it too is linked 
with the prices of the products they export: only 
a change for the better in these prices would 
rapidly raise the productivity of investment, 
measured in terms of importable goods. Other 
changes in productivity would call for new 
investments, and even structural reforms, which 
take time and require more financing. In this 
sense "financing" and "adjustment" are not 
alternatives, but complementary terms. 
A reduction of two points in the interest rate 
alleviates the saving effort by one to two percen-
tage points of the product and reduces by 
between one and two percentage points the rate 
of export growth that would be required. 
The return of real interest rates to their 
historical levels of between 1 % and 3 % per year, 
or specific measures to reduce the cost of the debt 
to those levels, would mean a reduction of the 
investment effort needed by two to four percen-
tage points of the product, while the rate of 
export growth needed would also be reduced by 
two to four percentage points. This appears to be 
an indispensable contribution by the creditors if 
the effort of the debtors is to be sustainable. 
We must therefore examine the nature of 
solutions to the debt problem that could be 
attained by lessening the burden of its servicing. 
The solution of the debt problem is in the inter-
ests of the debtors, but it also favours the credi-
tors themselves. On the one hand it improves 
the quality of their portfolio of assets and facili-
tates the return of the financial system to nor-
mality. It also makes possible a more normal 
handling of economic policy without the enor-
mous uncertainties that always accompany crisis 
situations. Finally, it permits a higher growth 
RELIEVING THE DEBT BURDEN: PAST EXPERIENCE AND PRESENT NEEDS / Carlos Massad 25 
rate in the debtor countries, whose purchases of 
all kinds from the creditor countries represent 
an appreciable element of dynamism for the 
economies of the latter. Studies made in respect 
of the United States indicate that perhaps a half 
of any reduction in the servicing of the Latin 
American debt will be devoted to purchases in 
that country (JEC, 1986). 
II 
Possible solutions 
The solutions designed to relieve the burden of 
the debt are based on five premise's (Massad, 
1986b): 
i) Both creditors and debtors must share the 
responsibility for the rapid growth of the debt. 
ii) The fact that the debt problem has 
reached an acute stage is the result not only of 
factors beyond the debtor countries' control (the 
policies applied by the industrial countries, the 
international recession, the procyclical behav-
iour of external financing), but also of the deb-
tors' own policies. Nevertheless, the widespread 
impact of the problem underlines the impor-
tance of the external factors. 
iii) The prolonged recessionary adjustment 
of the debtor countries' economies is 
unsustainable. 
iv) As time is needed for the reassignment of 
resources which is essential in order to generate 
the surpluses required for the servicing of the 
debt, adjustment and financing are not different 
approaches to the debt problem but both form 
part of its solution. 
v) It is in the interest both of the debtor and 
the creditor countries to reach a rapid solution of 
the present crisis. 
As recent experience shows, the reduction of 
the interest rate and the improvement of the 
terms of trade are crucial for the solution of the 
debt problem. Failing a market solution consist-
ent with both variables, every other solution 
points to a reduction of interest payments on the 
debt. There are two ways of tackling this issue. 
One is the restriction of interest payments in 
accordance with certain criteria of capacity to 
pay, such as total exports, the price of a key 
export product, total foreign exchange receipts, 
or the gross domestic product. The other method 
consists of a direct reduction, without accumula-
tion, of service payments. If the first method 
permitted the debt servicing to accumulate 
indefinitely above the limits adopted, then the 
first and the second methods would be finan-
cially equivalent. 
1. Reduction of interest payments 
on the debt 
The burden of the debt can be directly reduced 
either by lowering interest rates and other costs 
below the market rates or by a direct reduction of 
the principal of the debt. Although the two 
approaches differ in accounting terms, they are, 
under equal tax conditions, financially equival-
ent. The reduction of interest is reflected in the 
balance sheet of the creditor institution only 
with the passage of time (provided that account-
ing rules permit this), whereas the reduction in 
the principal of the debt is immediately reflected 
in full in the accounts. This accounting differ-
ence may be decisive for the stability of the 
creditor institution. 
Accounting rules are very important in this 
respect. In the United States, for instance, inter-
est concessions must be reflected in a charge 
against capital only if the sum of the future 
payments of capital and interest is lower than 
the total capital outstanding at the time of grant-
ing the concession (JEC, 1986). This means that, 
even if interest and commissions are reduced to 
zero, there is no compulsory charge against the 
capital of the debt if there is an assurance that 
this capital will be paid in the future. Hence the 
margin of negotiation of interest by the banks 
between zero and market rates is basically 
limited by the need to maintain a reasonable 
profitability on their own capital. 
The effects on the profits of the creditor 
banks of an alleviation of interest payments on 
the debt do not seem to be excessive. A study by 
the United States Congress points out that if 
Latin American interest payments had been 
reduced by US$12 billion in 1985 and if the 
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banks had written down by 1 % the value of their 
existing credits in Latin America in that year, the 
nine most important banks in the United States 
would have shown profits in 1985 which, after 
payment of taxes, were higher than the level 
recorded in 1984, even if those banks had 
absorbed a part of the reduction of interest in 
proportion to their credits with Latin America 
(JEC, 198Ó). It should be noted that the effects on 
the banks' profits (after tax) of a reduction of 
interest or a reduction of capital may differ 
according to the tax treatment applicable in each 
case. 
In so far as the reduction of interest 
improves the economic situation of the debtors, 
the prospects of the recovery of their capitai by 
the creditors improve also. Hence, when the risk 
commitment with a particular debtor is rela-
tively small compared with the total of a bank's 
portfolio of assets, the bank prefers to make 
concessions regarding interest rather than to 
grant new loans to the debtor at risk; in this way 
the debtor's situation is improved and the possi-
bility of recovery of capital is strengthened. 
According to private commercial bankers in the 
United States, the regional banks prefer this 
method to the granting of "fresh" money to 
foreign debtors. 
Numerous formulas have been proposed for 
reducing the cost of interest payments on the 
external debt. The reduction or elimination of 
commissions and other charges is one that has 
already been applied to a limited extent in the 
three rounds of renegotiations held since 1982. 
In the first, both the spread over the reference 
rate and the commissions were considerably 
higher than their levels before the crisis. The 
average spread in the first round reached 2.22% 
over LIBOR and the average commission 
amounted to 1.27% for the twelve countries 
involved in the renegotiations. In the second 
round, the average spread was reduced to 1.77% 
over LIBOR for the group of seven countries that 
renegotiated in 1983-1984, while the commis-
sions were reduced to 0.8%. In the third round, 
the average spread over LIBOR and the commis-
sions were reduced even further to 1.44% and 
0.42% respectively. In this last round some 
countries negotiated the complete elimination of 
commissions, but the spread over the reference 
rate was maintained, and was even much higher 
than that prevailing before the crisis, which in 
some cases was well below 1%. 
Thanks to direct negotiations between the 
debtors and the commercial banks, a reduction 
has thus been achieved ¡n the interest spreads 
and commissions in comparison with the high 
figures recorded in the first round of renegotia-
tions. Nonetheless, the reference interest rates 
remain above their historical levels. In some 
recent cases of renegotiations the traditional ref-
erence rates (LIBOR or Prime) have been 
replaced by rates representing the cost of attrac-
tion of funds on the part of the banks, which are 
lower than the traditional reference rates. The 
difference is only small, however, and may 
represent a relief on the cost to the debtor of no 
more than half a percentage point per year. 
A rescheduling of debt payments involves 
the separation of payment in national currency 
from payment in foreign exchange. If the benef-
its achieved in the rescheduling are not transmit-
ted in full to the individual debtor, the latter is 
still under the obligation to possess, at the dates 
originally agreed, the national currency needed 
to purchase the foreign exchange with which the 
debt or its service will finally be paid. Thus the 
rescheduling may imply a fiscal benefit, to the 
extent that the authorities of the debtor country 
demand payment in national currency from indi-
vidual debtors, while the payment abroad in for-
eign exchange is deferred in accordance with the 
rescheduling. This allows domestic monetary 
policy more room for manoeuvre and may also 
serve as a mechanism applicable in formulas 
designed to alleviate interest payments abroad. 
The formulas employed so far have not been 
sufficient to provide a notable relief in the ser-
vicing of the debt. Consequently, many other 
formulas are still being considered, both to 
reduce interest payment commitments and to 
modify the nature of these payments. The 
former include the automatic capitalization of 
interest at rates well below those in force and the 
payment of interest in national currency for sub-
sequent conversion into foreign exchange. 
The capitalization of interest would enable 
the annual interest payments to be regulated by 
capitalizing the amount exceeding certain limits. 
Thus as well as lightening the burden of interest 
payments an element of stability is introduced 
into the debtors' balance of payments by isolât-
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ing the annual interest payments from changes 
that may occur in international interest rates. 
Mechanisms of this type would form an auto-
matic stabilizer for the world economy. They 
would also help to distribute the cost of the 
capitalization proportionally among the 
creditors. 
The payment of interest in national currency 
(indexed in accordance with the currency in 
which the loan is expressed) is conceptually sim-
ilar to the foregoing method, with the difference 
that in this case the possibility is envisaged that 
the creditor may employ the funds accumulated 
in the national currency of the debtor country for 
certain specified uses. For instance, the accumu-
lated resources might be employed for purchas-
ing specific goods and services or certain 
securities or other assets in the debtor country, 
or they might also be lent again in that country; 
the conversion of these funds into foreign cur-
rency and the corresponding payment abroad 
would be subject to stipulated formulas linked, 
for example, with total exports or the value of 
the exports of a key product for the economy in 
question. This mechanism might also be handled 
so as to regulate payments of interest to the 
exterior and convert them into a relatively con-
stant flow over time. 
Any of the options for payment in national 
currency that would be usable locally would, if 
given generalized application, undoubtedly have 
macroeconomic effects in the debtor country 
both in terms of inflationary pressures and of 
changes in the structure of ownership. 
2. Reduction of the principal of the debt 
Another way of reducing interest payments to 
the exterior is the direct reduction of the princi-
pal of the debt. The straightforward accounting 
write-down of the State-guaranteed debt might 
have negative effects on the debtors' future 
access to the normal market, so that this possibi-
lity can only be considered when the debtors do 
not expect to have further recourse to the market 
for a prolonged period. This is not usual with the 
Latin American countries, so that for them the 
methods for reducing the principal of the debt 
are more limited. There are, however, formulas, 
which enable the principal of the debt to be 
reduced without affecting the debtors' access to 
the commercial credit market. For instance, a 
secondary market of debt bonds such as that 
which has been emerging since the end of 1984 
would enable the debtors to purchase their own 
debt at a capital value below 100% of the debt, 
when the market values it in this way.1 Transac-
tions are known to have been carried out at 
values between 60% and 90% of the nominal 
debt, depending on the countries involved, and 
some of them have set up formal mechanisms 
for the repurchase of their own debt with the 
commercial banks (for example, Chile). 
Obviously, the reduction of the principal of the 
debt implies a reduction in interest payments. So 
far, operations of this kind represent only small 
percentages of the total debt of the residents of 
the countries in question with the banks. 
There have also been proposals for the 
transfer of assets of the commercial banks to 
multilateral agencies, which would purchase 
them for less than their nominal value and take 
over the task of rescheduling the debtors' pay-
ments, transferring to the latter the benefit of 
the lower value of these assets. The difficulty 
about these proposals is that the operation 
would require an increase in the capital of the 
multilateral institutions concerned or would 
exhaust the margins of capital available for 
direct loans by them. Consequently, this type of 
solution does not seem to represent a formula 
that would lead to an increase in the net resour-
ces available to debtors. For the creditors, how-
ever, it might prove attractive if they perceive a 
considerable and widespread risk in their pres-
ent portfolio. 
3. Transformation of debt into 
equity capital 
One way of changing the nature of the interest 
payment commitment which can also be com-
bined with the repurchase of the debt is the 
transformation of the latter into equity capital. 
By doing this, the nature of the commitment is 
changed, since the regular payment of interest is 
replaced by remittances of profits as these are 
generated. Since the State does not guarantee the 
commercial risk of the investments, the trans-
formation of debt into equity capital means in 
1
 It may be argued that the co-existence of a debt valued below 
its nominal value and of new loans is only due to the fact that the 
latter are not voluntary. The line between "voluntary" and invo-
luntary" new loans is by no means clear. 
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practice the elimination of the public guarantees 
which might be committed in respect of the debt. 
This transformation could also reduce the rigid-
ity of the annual amounts of remittances to the 
exterior, since the profits are dependent on the 
economic result of the enterprise. 
In view of the magnitudes involved, the 
transformation of debt into equity capital, if car-
ried out on a widespread basis, might signify a 
very important change in the ownership of the 
national wealth, with the ensuing political 
effects. 
The repurchase of debt and its transforma-
tion into equity capital could serve as a mecha-
nism to facilitate the return of national capital 
invested abroad. If the operation of repurchase 
and investment involves attractive profits, as 
seems to be the case in the transactions carried 
out so far, it would not be surprising if national 
capital abroad were attracted by the opportuni-
ties offered by such a process. 
4. Debt from official sources 
The solution mechanisms referred to are mainly 
applicable to debt from private sources. As 
regards debt from official sources, which repres-
ents a relatively small proportion of the debt for 
Latin American countries as a whole, the terms 
of the renegotiations agreed to should not be 
limited by the same criteria of profitability as 
those that apply to the loans of commercial 
banks. Indeed, this is what has happened in 
practice, since the renegotiations with the Paris 
Club provide for no commissions or spreads over 
certain reference rates. What is more, in recent 
renegotiations the creditor countries have 
agreed to reschedule not only capital maturities 
but also interest payments (Dominican Repub-
lic). Nonetheless, many public export-financing 
institutions in the creditor countries tend to 
limit their loans when maturities are being rene-
gotiated, thus acting in the same way as the 
commercial banks. 
The governments of the creditor countries 
are not subject to the same restrictions as the 
commercial banks in the writing-off of certain 
loans, although the rules vary from country to 
country. The cancellation or writing-off of debts 
by a creditor government need not have the 
same effects on additional financing as such 
reductions entail for the debtors in the commer-
cial banking system. The same is true of reduc-
tions in interest payments. Thus, in those cases 
where substantial relief in the payment of the 
debt is needed the contribution that external 
official creditors might make can be very impor-
tant. At present a third of the total Latin Ameri-
can external debt comes from sources other than 
banks, particularly government institutions and 
official multilateral agencies. 
Ill 
Some concrete proposals 
1. The proposal of the President of the 
Inter-American Development Bank 
The President of the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, Antonio Ortiz Mena, has put for-
ward an ingenious proposal. Although it has not 
been worked out in every detail, the main idea is 
to refinance automatically a proportion of the 
interest payments on the debt, thus reducing 
their cost, through the transfer of the necessary 
amounts by the creditor banks to a special fund 
to finance investment projects for the promo-
tion of export growth in the debtor countries. 
The growth of exports would subsequently facil-
itate the return of the loaned sources to the 
special fund and thence to the original creditors. 
This would establish a form of automatic partial 
refinancing of the interest by the banks, the use 
of the resources thus provided being confined to 
projects for the expansion of exports (Montag-
non, 1986). 
2. The Baker initiative 
In October 1985 the United States Secretary of 
the Treasury, James A. Baker, proposed a set of 
ideas as guidelines for solving the problem of the 
debt (Baker, 1985). Baker accepts the statement 
of the debtor countries that the debt problem can 
only be solved in a framework of growth and 
co-operation between creditors and debtors. He 
points out the need for structural reforms 
designed to liberalize the trade and payments of 
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the debtor countries and to give more impor-
tance in these countries to private enterprise, as 
a condition for gaining access to new loans both 
from the commercial banks and from the multi-
lateral financing agencies. At the time of its 
presentation the Baker initiative envisaged new 
financing in the amount of some US$ 10 billion 
per year for three years, 70% of which would 
come from the commercial banks. This would 
allow for a nominal growth of around 3% per 
year in the debt of the countries covered by the 
initiative. 
This initiative is the first official proposal by 
the United States Government which recognizes 
the need for government action by the creditor 
countries to solve the problem of the debt. 
Although the multilateral financing agencies 
have conducted their operations subsequent to 
the announcement of the Baker initiative within 
its framework, up to mid-1986 the commercial 
banks had not done so. Moreover, the collapse of 
oil prices from the beginning of 1986 invalidated 
the amounts involved in this initiative (ECLAC 
1986). 
3. Proposal of the Cartagena Consensus 
The eleven Latin American signatories of the 
Cartagena Consensus (Argentina, Bolivia, Bra-
zil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) 
have put forward an emergency proposal for 
negotiations on the subject of the external debt 
and growth. The proposal does not advocate a 
collective renegotiation of the terms of the outs-
tanding external debt but it does emphasize the 
need to establish an international economic cli-
mate appropriate for solving the problem. This 
climate should include the reduction of interest 
rates to their traditional levels, an increase in the 
flow of finance, and the strengthening of inter-
national machinery to help cushion the impact 
on the developing countries of fluctuations in 
the terms of trade and interest rates. The signa-
tory countries have pointed out the need to dis-
tinguish between the treatment of the debt 
already contracted and that of the new debt, so as 
to facilitate treatment of the latter on market 
terms, while making possible the application of 
more favourable conditions for the outstanding 
debt. 
The proposal states the need to put an end to 
the protectionist measures that hamper the sale 
of the debtor countries' products in world mar-
kets and stresses the importance of setting a 
limit on net transfers of resources in respect of 
debt servicing which will be compatible with a 
reasonable growth rate of the GDP. The coun-
tries of the Consensus have sought to initiate a 
dialogue between debtors and creditors on these 
topics, which are of interest to all, and have 
insisted that the precise terms of the renegotia-
tion of the debt as such must be a matter for 
agreement between individual debtors and their 
creditors. 
4. Proposals in the United States Congress 
The need to seek an alleviation of the debt bur-
den —an achievement which would benefit both 
debtors and creditors— is beginning to be recog-
nized in political circles in the creditor countries. 
Proposals on the subject have recently been pre-
sented by Senators and Representatives in the 
United States Congress. 
In declarations made in April, May and June 
of 1986, Senator Bill Bradley (Bradley, 1986) 
points to the desirability of providing relief in 
the form of a reduction of debt interest and 
principal, to be negotiated between each debtor 
country and a commission made up of govern-
ment and banking creditors and international 
agencies. These negotiations would lead to the 
establishment of a set of support measures for 
those developing debtor countries which were 
willing to adopt reforms designed to promote 
growth, increase domestic saving and restrain 
capital flight. One of the elements to be conside-
red would be the use of democratic processes to 
ensure that the plans for economic reform in the 
debtor countries would have widespread domes-
tic support. 
Senatorjohn F. Kerry, for his part, advocates 
an international development programme 
which fixes a ceiling for debt servicing as a per-
centage of exports and a progressive alleviation 
of the servicing burden according to the degree 
of disequilibrium in the debtor's trade balance 
(Kerry, 1986). The programme would be finan-
ced by contributions from all the developed 
countries. A board of seven members would 
direct the programme, four being elected and the 
other three representing the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and GATT. The 
executive secretary would be chosen from among 
the elected members by vote of the seven. 
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Representative Charles E. Schumer propo-
ses a maximum limit of 2 5 % of exports for the 
servicing of the debt and the writing-off by the 
banks of a proportion of the loans on the basis of 
an estimate made by the United States Govern-
ment as to what would be a reasonable payment 
on the debt (Schumer, 1986). The writing-off 
would be a long-term operation, so as not to 
create problems of capital for the creditor 
institutions. 
5. The Rohatyn proposal 
The President of the Corporation for Aid to the 
Municipality of New York, Felix Rohatyn, has 
The foregoing proposals are aimed at lightening 
the burden of the current debt, but not at correc-
ting the defects in the system that cause the 
recurrent external financial problems of the 
developing countries and imcrease their vulne-
rability to negative external influences. These 
defects are reflected in the procyclical behaviour 
of external financing and in an asymmetrical 
adjustment process which only imposes effective 
discipline on countries which have to seek 
finance from the International Monetary Fund. 
1. The procyclical behaviour of 
external financing 
A repeated lesson of history is that international 
financing behaves in a markedly procyclical 
manner. In the past century the loans obtained 
by the new Latin American republics to defend 
their recently won independence were obtained 
through the sale of bonds in England. Argentina 
(Buenos Aires), Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, 
Mexico and Peru floated their issues in London 
between 1820 and 1825. At the end of that year, 
as a result of the financial panic in England, the 
flow of finance was halted, and in the following 
two years all the debtors except Brazil suspended 
interest payments. It took thirty years of succes-
sive renegotiations to regularize the situation. In 
the third and fourth decades of the past century 
the debt of the states making up the United 
States grew to fifteen times its 1820 size. The 
depression that began in 1837 in England halted 
emphasized the desirability of securing a major 
reduction in the interest rates applicable and 
extending the credit payment periods. This 
relief would be accompanied by new capital for 
the developing countries, coming not from the 
banking system but from the countries with a big 
trade surplus, especially Japan. The programme 
would be supervised by the World Bank, and the 
beneficiary countries would undertake to carry 
out domestic reforms to improve their efficiency 
and increase the importance of the private sector 
(Rohatyn, 1986). 
financial flows to the United States, and nine 
states of that country suspended interest pay-
ments in 1841-1842; two of them, Mississippi 
and Florida, repudiated the whole of their debt 
and one, Michigan, repudiated part of it. The 
other six simply ceased to pay interest, without 
any official announcement (Solomon, 1983). 
A new wave of defaults occurred during the 
depression of 1873 which brought with it, as did 
the earlier ones, a fall in international capital 
movements, which in its turn unleashed a crisis 
in the servicing of the debt. Eleven states of the 
United States fell into arrears. In view of the 
need to create a mechanism to facilitate negotia-
tions between the official debtors that issued 
bonds and their holders of these on the London 
market, the British Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders was set up in this market and 
represented them in the negotiations which 
regularly took place and which ended in the 
reduction of the principal or in the rescheduling 
of payments of principal and interest. The only 
debtors in default that did not reach an agree-
ment with this Corporation in its half-century of 
life up to 1914 were the states of the United 
States which had repudiated their debts (Feis, 
1930). 
A similar commission was set up in the Uni-
ted States in 1933 with the name of Foreign 
Bondholder Protective Council. 
In the great crisis of the 1930s, the group of 
main debtor countries exported net capital bet-
IV 
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ween 1931 and 1937 (the worst years of the 
depression), while the main creditor countries 
received a heavy net inflow of capital (North, 
1962). Both in the great crisis of the 1930s and in 
that of the 1980s the United States absorbed 
capital from overseas. During this latter crisis 
the Latin American foreign debt, which had been 
growing at the rate of around 20 % per year since 
the mid-1970s, suddenly reduced its growth rate 
to 8% in 1983, 5.6% in 1984 and 2.1 % in 1985. 
This last rate of growth of the debt is conside-
rably lower than the international inflation rate. 
The increase in the debt is also lower than the 
direct payments of interest and profits to the 
exterior. 
The phenomenon of the procydical beha-
viour of foreign financing has been recognized 
for over forty years. It was assumed that the 
World Bank would fulfil the function of provi-
ding anticyclical finance in the postwar period 
(League of the Nations, 1945a). 
Repeated historical experience underscores 
the need to look at the debt problem not only on 
a country-by-country basis, but also from a 
system-wide point of view: a need which is ali 
the more imperative in view of the fallacies of 
generalization that can arise through the recom-
mendation of policies which may be appropriate 
for individual countries but which are counter-
productive for the group of countries as a whole. 
Hence, solutions of the debt problem, call not 
only for national policies promoting the neces-
sary economic adjustments and measures by the 
creditors to lighten the burden of the debt, but 
also for modifications in the international mone-
tary and financial systems, as well as in world 
trade. 
2. The monetary system and the debt: 
stabilizing mechanisms 
There is already recognition of the lack of 
symmetry in the international monetary system 
in relation to adjustment policies. This defect 
increases the burden that falls on the debtor 
countries, which are subject to effective stimula-
ting or dissuasive mechanisms. The problem of 
asymmetry is, in the final analysis, a problem of 
the power that the official international agencies 
can exercise over their members. Hence it is an 
extremely difficult one to solve in practice. 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize the 
existence of this asymmetry in order to seek 
solutions which, without having an adverse 
effect on the interests of the creditor countries, 
will alleviate the problems of the debtor coun-
tries. In view of the nature of the problem to be 
solved, it is desirable to strengthen the existing 
mechanisms, while creating others designed to 
increase the financing available from the official 
multilateral agencies, and to perfect machinery 
to soften the effects of external events on the 
economies of the developing debtor countries. 
Increasing the resources available from the 
multilateral agencies would make it possible to 
offset the procyclical behaviour of the present 
financial flows and stimulate the contribution of 
resources by private institutions in the interna-
tional market to these countries. At the same 
time, it would enable more rational conditions to 
be established for the granting of loans. 
This last aspect is of the greatest impor-
tance, since the conditionality applied by the 
official multilateral agencies for the use of their 
resources is closely linked with the resources at 
their disposal: the more limited they are, the 
more rigorous and generally more recessionary 
is the conditionality applied. The more limited 
the resources, the shorter is the time in which 
the adjustment must be carried out, which makes 
it more drastic. If the adjustment is not carried 
out on a symmetrical basis whereby the creditor 
countries contribute to it through their own poli-
cies, the greater will be the demands to be met by 
the credit available for relieving the burden on 
the debtor countries. 
As regards the s hock-absorbing mecha-
nisms, it should be noted that two such mecha-
nisms of general application have been 
established since the Second World War, both 
under the aegis of the International Monetary 
Fund: the compensatory financing facility for 
falls in export income and the oil facility; the 
latter functioned only as a transitory mechanism 
that provided resources in the years 1974-1975, 
and it ended its operations in mid-1976. 
A third instrument is the subsidy account 
destined to reduce, for low-income countries, the 
cost of using the resources of the supplementary 
financing facility of the Fund. 
Finally, the buffer stock financing facility has 
been little used and only in relation to two pro-
ducts, tin and sugar. 
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Because of the limited financial resources 
available, all these mechanisms have included a 
set of very restrictive conditions governing their 
use. They were conceived to solve problems of 
individual countries or products, on the assump-
tion that the economy as a whole would maintain 
a normal financing. Apart from these mechani-
sis, others are needed to act as automatic stabili-
zers in the case of global problems, and 
particularly the following three: variations in 
international interest rates, fluctuations in the 
terms of trade, and the procyclical behaviour of 
external financing. 
The variations in international interest rates 
have exceeded all expectations. These rates rose 
abruptly in 1980-1981, reaching levels three or 
four times higher than those recorded in pre-
vious years, after which they fell to a little less 
than half their maximum levels. Real interest 
rates followed the movements of nominal rates, 
although today they are three times as high as 
the historical rates. In view of the growth of the 
foreign debt of the developing debtor countries, 
especially in Latin America, in comparison with 
almost any variable of scale, together with the 
change in the composition of the debt into one 
with a variable rate, the changes in interest rates 
have a very marked effect on the external and 
internal equilibrium of the debtor countries. 
Mechanisms to soften the effects of interest 
rate variations on the economies of debtor coun-
tries can take numerous forms. One possibility is 
the extension of the coverage of the Internatio-
nal Monetary Fund's compensatory financing 
facility to include rises in international interest 
rates above a certain specified level (for exam-
ple, a movable ten-year average). At the end of 
1985, each percentage point of variation in the 
interest rate signified almost US$ 6 billion for 
the developing countries as a whole. Formulas 
applicable at the national level might also be 
employed, such as automatically capitalizing 
interest payments above a certain limit. This 
type of formula at the national level has already 
been mentioned in earlier pages. 
I n the case of variations in the terms of trade, 
action would need to be taken in three directions. 
The first, already mentioned, would be to extend 
the coverage of the International Monetary 
Fund's compensatory financing facility. To give 
a rough idea of the sums involved, suffice it to say 
that the 16.5% fall in the terms of trade for the 
Latin American and Caribbean countries bet-
ween 1980 and 1985, has reduced the purchasing 
power of their exports by US$ 300 billion over 
the said period. 
The second relates to the access of the goods 
produced by developing countries to the main 
world markets, the aim being to facilitate the 
diversification of production and exports in 
these countries and to avoid transferring to them 
the cost of market protection in the industriali-
zed countries. 
Finally, as regards the procyclical behaviour 
of external financing, it would be necessary to 
study the relaxation of the debt-capital ratios of 
the multilateral development financing agen-
cies, so that they could speedily enlarge their 
operations at moments of retrenchment of the 
private markets and reduce them when these 
markets expanded more vigorously. By relaxing 
the debt-capital ratio, the international agencies 
would be able to acquire in the markets the 
resources which the developing countries are not 
in a position to obtain, at this stage of the pro-
cess, as experience has shown. 
Naturally, the introduction of automatic sta-
bilizing mechanisms will become less urgent, 
and even perhaps unnecessary, if symmetry can 
be achieved as regards the adjustment efforts of 
the creditor and debtor economies. As this seems 
very difficult to attain, however, the stabilizing 
mechanisms, or their absence, will have a power-
ful influence on the world economy in the 
coming years. 
3. The monetary system and conditionally 
Controversy over the conditions on which these 
agencies are prepared to lend their resources to 
their member countries recurs whenever these 
resources become scarce. Likewise, the willing-
ness of the countries to apply adjustment poli-
cies that follow the traditional rules of these 
institutions is in direct proportion to their need 
to obtain new resources. 
Between 1975 and 1982, the period of abun-
dance in the international financial markets, the 
analysis of conditionality was set aside, to appear 
again abruptly when the net financial flows to 
the debtor countries were halted. 
From the standpoint of the multilateral 
agencies, the conditionality must be such as to 
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permit the functioning of the economy at a level 
of activity compatible with the resources availa-
ble within the context of a given situation of the 
world economy. From the standpoint of the 
countries using the resources of the multilateral 
agencies, however, this view of the problem 
leads to a contraction of economic activity and 
employment which is often unsustainable. As a 
higher level of economic activity would usually 
call for greater financial resources from abroad, 
the incompatibility of the two criteria is obvious. 
Although there is a certain margin for growth by 
saving financial resources through the applica-
tion of policies that discriminate between diffe-
rent uses of the resources, this margin is 
generally limited and does not last for long. In a 
world economic and financial system that is 
asymmetrical in applying the discipline of 
adjustment, the limited availability of the 
resources is what determines the conditio nal ¡ty 
applied, so that the multilateral agencies can 
hardly take into consideration the growth needs 
of the countries. With insufficient resources, any 
conditionality will inevitably be recessionary. 
Even that which aims at producing structural 
changes to improve efficiency will have this cha-
racter, since these changes also require time and 
financing. 
In a world in which an asymmetrical adjust-
ment mechanism is operating, only an increase 
in available financing and the introduction of 
stabilizing mechanisms can minimize the reces-
sionary effects of the conditionality. 
The lack of finance on appropriate terms 
introduces an inevitable recessionary bias into 
the conditionality. Such conditionality, which 
has to be formulated within the framework of 
the real functioning of the world economic 
system, could be modified, however, to the 
extent that the multilateral financing agencies 
succeed in playing the anti-cyclical role which 
belongs to them and if appropriate stabilizing 
mechanisms can be introduced into the econo-
mic system. As the IMF has done to a limited 
extent in recent years, it is the task of the multi-
lateral financing agencies to play a very active 
part in procuring funds to finance adjustment 
programmes that do not involve drastic falls in 
the per capita product and do not increase unem-
ployment. These programmes will certainly not 
be of a stereotyped nature, since they must take 
into account the special features and economic 
and social priorities of each of the countries 
requiring resources. With more adequate funds, 
however, conditionality and growth cease to be 
opposing options. 
Annex 
MODEL USED IN THE SIMULATION EXERCISES 
A) The model: 
From the fundamental equations of the 
product we have: 
1. Y = C + I 4- EX - IMP where: 
Y = Gross domestic product 
C = Domestic consumption 
I = Gross domestic investment 
EX = Exports of goods and services 
IMP = Imports of goods and services. 
2. Y - C - I = EX - IMP, but 
3. Y - C = A 
where: A = Total domestic saving. 
4. I - A = IMP - EX 
Moreover, we define the growth of the debt as a 
function of: 
5. dD= INT + IMP - EX 
where: D — Total external debt 
6. 
7. 
INT — Payments of interest to 
the exterior 
dD = Annual growth in D. 
Replacing (4) in (5) and dividing by D, we 
have: 










interest rate (and other 
expenses) actually paid on 
the debt. 
Multiplying and dividing (6) by Y as 
applicable, we have: 
w 
dD Y r I A 
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B) For the purposes of the simulation the 
equation simulated was defined on the basis 
of (7): 
A _ , Y I dD , D 
Y D Y D Y 
In the exercise the following conditions were 
assumed: 
a) A growth rate of the product of 4 % . 
b) Investment/product ratio needed equal to 
20%. 
c) External interest rates of: 12%, 10%, 8%, 
6% and 4%. 
d) Debt/product ratio of 1.0, 0.7 and 0.5. 
e) Growth rates of the debt of 7%, 3% and 0%. 
f) Growth rate of imports given by: 




where: n = Product elasticity (cyclical) of 
imports. 
The (cyclical) elasticity was obtained by 
means of an econometric estimate for the 
period 1970-1985°. 
2 EX IMP 
g) The growth of exports is given by: 
I A IMP EX 




"The function used to estimate the (cyclical) product elasticity 
of imports was; 





The sign ^ indicates 
= Imports 
= Gross domestic 
product
 A 
= Dummy • GDP 
dummy = 1 if (¡DP < 0 
= 0 if GDP0 > 0 





We know that: 
/ EX \
 = EX (1 + EX) 
Y Y ( 1 + Y ) 
4) (Ei.) (1+Y)= Ü1(1+EX) 
Y Y 
5) EX= [( E i ) (1+Y-l) ] JL 
Y EX 
where the sign A indicates growth rate. 
All the variables are measured in dollars at 
current prices. 
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